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Using a standard decomposition of forecasts errors into common and idiosyncratic 
shocks, we show that aggregate forecast uncertainty can be expressed as the disagree-
ment among the forecasters plus the perceived variability of future aggregate shocks. 
Thus, the reliability of disagreement as a proxy for uncertainty will be determined by 
the stability of the forecasting environment, and the length of the forecast horizon. 
Using density forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, we find direct 
evidence in support of our hypothesis. Our results support the use of GARCH-type 
models, rather than the ex post squared error in consensus forecasts, to estimate the ex 
ante variability of aggregate shocks as a component of aggregate uncertainty. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Forecast uncertainty is playing an increasingly important role in macroeconomics 
and monetary policy making. For instance, effective November 2008, the U.S. Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC) will publish information about uncertainty associated 
with their economic outlooks. Since the mid-90s the Bank of England has been reporting 
fan charts that show subjective confidence bands surrounding official forecasts. Since 
forecast uncertainty is unobservable, economists have experimented with alternative 
proxies for it. One of the more popular measures has been forecast disagreement, simply 
calculated as the dispersion in alternative point forecasts. When disagreement is taken to 
indicate uncertainty, the underlying assumption is that this inter-personal dispersion 
measure is an acceptable proxy for the average dispersion of intra-personal predictive 
probabilities held by individual experts. The validity of this assumption can by no means 
be taken for granted. Since the seminal work of Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987), 
economists have studied but disagreed on whether disagreement is a good proxy for 
uncertainty.
1 As pointed out by Bomberger (1996) and Giordani and Söderlind (2003), 
disagreement remains to be theoretically an unfounded measure of uncertainty. 
Interestingly, there has been a parallel but largely independent research in the accounting 
and finance literature on whether disagreement among financial or market analysts can be 
used as a proxy for uncertainty about future earnings.
2  
In this paper, we establish a simple relationship connecting forecast uncertainty to 
disagreement. Using a standard decomposition of forecast errors into common and 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Bomberger (1996, 1999), Rich and Butler (1998), Giordani and Söderlind (2003), Lahiri 
and Liu (2005), and Boreo, Smith and Wallis (2007). 
2 See Zhang (2006) and references therein. Barry and Jennings (1992), Abarbanell et al. (1995), Barron et 
al. (1998), Diether et al. (2002) and Johnson (2004) have argued that disagreement alone is not sufficient to 
approximate uncertainty.   3
idiosyncratic components, we show that forecast uncertainty equals disagreement plus the 
variance of future aggregate shocks that accumulate over the horizons. This finding has 
important implications for the empirical studies using disagreement as a proxy for 
uncertainty. It suggests that the robustness of the proxy depends on the variance of 
aggregate shocks over time and across horizons. It also simplifies the multi-dimensional 
covariance matrix of individual forecast errors in Barry and Jennings (1992) in terms of 
the variance of aggregate shocks, which can be easily interpreted as the uncertainty 
shared by all forecasters due to their exposure to future common shocks. 
Using a panel of density forecasts from Survey of Professional Forecasters over 
1969-2007, we find direct evidence in support of our hypothesized time and horizon 
effects. As for the time effect, disagreement is found to be a reliable measure for 
uncertainty in a stable period. In periods with large volatility of aggregate shocks, 
however, disagreement becomes less reliable a proxy. As for the horizon effect, we find 
that the longer the forecast horizon, the larger is the difference between disagreement and 
uncertainty.  
In recent accounting and finance literature, squared errors in consensus forecasts 
have been used to proxy for the variance of future aggregate shocks as a component of 
forecast uncertainty. Our results suggest that adding squared mean forecast error to 
disagreement can make the estimated uncertainty worse than the use of disagreement 
alone.  If one wants to construct a robust ex ante measure of uncertainty, our suggestion 
is to use the sum of the observed disagreement from the survey and the variance of future 
aggregate shocks generated by GARCH-type models that use a moving average squared 
errors over past few years as one of the covariates.   4
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop the 
theoretical model and derive the relationship between disagreement and uncertainty. 
Section 3 tests empirically whether disagreement is a reliable proxy for uncertainty and 
suggests a method to construct the ex ante measure of uncertainty. Section 4 concludes.  
2. THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
For N individuals, T target years, H forecast horizons, let  ith F  be the forecast of 
the variable of interest made by agent i, for the target year t and h-quarter ahead to the 
end of the target year, and  t A  be the actual value of variable. The individual forecast 
error ( ith e ) is defined as 
ith t ith F A e − = .          ( 1 )  
Following Davies and Lahiri (1995), we write  ith e  as the sum of a component common to 
all forecasters ( th λ ) and idiosyncratic errors ( ith ε ): 







tj th u λ          ( 3 )  
The common component ( th λ ) represents the cumulative effect of all shocks that 
occurred from h-quarter ahead to the end of target year t. Equation (3) specifies  th λ as the 
accumulation of all quarterly aggregate shocks ( tj u ) over the forecast horizon. 
We make the following simplifying assumptions:  
Assumption 1: 
0 ) ( = tj u E ; 
2 ) var( tj u tj u σ =  for any t and j; 0 ) ( = ts tju u E  for any t and  s j ≠ ; 
0 ) ( , = − h k t thu u E  for any t, h and  0 ≠ k .   5
Assumption 2: 
0 ) ( = ith E ε ; 
2 ) var( ith ith ε σ ε =  for any i, t and h;  0 ) ( = jth ith E ε ε  for any t, h and  j i ≠ . 
Assumption 3: 
0 ) ( , = − j k t ithu E ε  for any i, t, h, k and j. 
Thus, aggregate shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated over time and horizons 
(assumption 1). The idiosyncratic errors ( ith ε ) capture forecaster heterogeneity due to 
differences in information acquisition and processing, interpretation, judgment, 
forecasting models, etc., and are taken to be mutually uncorrelated at all leads and lags 
(assumption 2). In addition, the common component and idiosyncratic disturbances are 
assumed to be uncorrelated at all leads and lags (assumption 3), which is a standard 
assumption in the literature. Taken together, assumptions 1 to 3 imply that the individual 
forecast error is a zero-mean stationary process for any h and has the factor model 
interpretation.  
The observed disagreement ( th d ) among forecasters is the variance of their point 



























th ith th N N
F F
N












. Note that the sample variance  th d  is a random variable prior to 
observing forecasts. Taking expectations, we get the non-random disagreement, denoted 
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ε σ         ( 5 )  
Thus, not surprisingly, we find that  th D  is determined by the average variance of 
idiosyncratic errors.
3  
The uncertainty associated with a forecast of any specific individual is measured 
by the variance of individual forecast error, and can be expressed as  
. ) ( ) (
2 2
ith th ith th ith t ith Var F A Var U ε λ σ σ ε λ + = + = − ≡     (6) 
Individual forecast uncertainty in (6) is comprised of two components: perceived 
uncertainty associated with forthcoming common shocks, 
2
th λ σ  and idiosyncratic shocks, 
2
ith ε σ . Following Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987), we measure overall forecast uncertainty 











measures the confidence an outside observer will have in a randomly drawn typical 
individual forecast from the panel of forecasters.
4 Given our model,  th U  can be expressed 









ith th th N
U ε λ σ σ        ( 7 )  
After substituting (5) into (7), we get 
.
2
th th th D U + = λ σ         ( 8 )    
                                                 
3 The number of forecasters in the survey changes over both t and h. For simplicity, we suppress the 
subscripts t and h of N in equation (4) and thereafter. 
4  See also Lahiri et al. (1988), Bomberger (1996), Giordani and Söderlind (2003), and Boero et al. (2007).   7
Given the model assumptions, forecast uncertainty, disagreement and the variance of 
forthcoming aggregate shocks are expected to be related in the sample as in (8) − 
uncertainty is simply the disagreement plus the variance of the accumulated aggregate 
shocks over the forecast horizon. Thus, the wedge between uncertainty and disagreement 
will be determined partly by the size of the forecast horizon over which the aggregate 
shocks accumulate – the longer is the forecast horizon the bigger will be the difference on 
the average. It also suggests that the robustness of the relationship between two will 
depend on the variability of aggregate shocks over time. In relatively stable time periods 
where the variability of aggregate shocks is small, whether the variability of these shocks 
were correctly perceived or not, disagreement will be a good proxy for the unobservable 
aggregate forecast uncertainty. In periods where the volatility of aggregate shocks is high, 
disagreement can become a tenuous proxy for uncertainty.  
In the context of equation (8), one can understand the efforts of Bomberger (1996) 
who examined the dependence of the variance of consensus forecast errors (called 
“consensus uncertainty”) on forecast disagreement using Livingston’s survey data on 
inflation expectations. Certainly, a positive relationship between the two during periods 
of economic instability will ensure that disagreement will continue to be positively 
correlated with the overall forecast uncertainty. However, since the difference between 
uncertainty and disagreement is the variance of unanticipated aggregate shocks (as will 
be explained later, this is approximately the same as the “consensus uncertainty”), 
theoretically it is not clear why disagreement will be able to predict it. Our model 
assumptions, though admittedly simple, rule out any feedback from perceived future 
variability of common shocks to current idiosyncratic individual variances. However, it is   8
possible that enhanced future uncertainty about common shocks affects current individual 
2
ith ε σ  and co-vary with 
2
th λ σ . This is how Bomberger’s (1996) econometric exercise can 
be justified. On the other hand, as Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) have pointed out, there 
may be periods where all forecasters agree on relatively high macroeconomic uncertainty 
in the immediate future, and hence disagreement between forecasters will be low even 
though uncertainty is high. The opposite is also possible where forecasters disagree a lot 
about their mean forecasts, but they are confident about their individual predictions. This 
situation will arise when forecasters disagree on otherwise precise models and scenarios 
that should be used to depict the movement of the economy over the forecasting horizon. 
Thus, lacking any theoretical basis, the strength and the stability of the relationship 
between disagreement and overall forecast uncertainty (not merely 
2
th λ σ  or consensus 
uncertainty) becomes an empirical issue. But our result clearly suggests that the 
relationship will crucially depend on the sample period, the target variable, and length of 
the forecast horizon. Our analysis also helps to reconcile the divergent findings in 
previous empirical studies examining the appropriateness of disagreement as a proxy for 
forecast uncertainty. Certainly, to the contrary to a statement in Bomberger (1996, p.385), 
it is not necessary that “if disagreement is to be a good proxy for individual uncertainty, it 
must also track consensus uncertainty”.  
In our current framework, we model the variance of forecast errors without 
modeling forecasters’ expectation formation process. Actually, it is easy to connect our 
model with Bayesian learning framework that models individuals’ forecasting behavior. 
Suppose that each forecaster is endowed with two signals: one public signal, represented 
by    9
th t th A l η + = ,  ) 1 , 0 ( ~
2
th th N η σ η ,           ( 9 )  
and one private signal, represented by  
ith t ith A s ζ + = ,  ) 1 , 0 ( ~
2
ith ith N ζ σ ζ .         ( 1 0 )  
The private signal is assumed to be independent of the public signal and also independent 
of other private signals, which are standard assumptions in the literature, cf. Lahiri and 
Sheng (2007). Each forecaster then combines these two sources of information, via Bayes 
rule, to derive the conditional expected value of  t A  as  
) ( ) ( ) , (
2 2 2 2
ith th ith ith th th ith th t ith s l s l A E F ζ η ζ η σ σ σ σ + + = ≡ ,     (11)
5 
and the conditional variance of  t A  as 
) ( 1 ) , (
2 2
ith th ith th t ith s l A Var U ζ η σ σ + = ≡ .      ( 1 2 )  
The individual forecast uncertainty defined in (12) reflects the uncertainty in both the 
public and private information, which is similar to (6) where the individual forecast 
uncertainty is comprised of perceived uncertainty associated with forthcoming common 
shocks and idiosyncratic shocks. Then we measure overall forecast uncertainty ( th U ) as 
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ζ η σ σ
       ( 1 3 )  
                                                 
5 Under the assumption that 
2 2
th ith ζ ζ σ σ =  for all i, the individual forecast error can be written as 
ith th th th th th th th ith e ζ σ σ σ η σ σ σ ζ η ζ ζ η η ] ) ( [ ] ) ( [
2 2 2 2 2 2 + − + + − = , where the first and second term on 
the right-hand side correspond to  th λ  and  ith ε  in (2), respectively.   10
Note that overall forecast uncertainty in (13), derived in the context of Bayesian learning 
framework, provides the justification that the aggregate uncertainty can be defined as the 
simple average of individual uncertainties as in (7). It is a combined uncertainty in the 
context of forecast combination literature with equal weights.
6  
The disagreement among forecasters can be measured by the expected dispersion 
of  ith F . To examine the effect of new information on the disagreement, we consider the 
so-called pre-posterior variance of opinions across forecasters. For any given information 
system represented by 
2
th η σ  and 
2
ith ζ σ , the pre-posterior variance is the variance based on 
the distribution of the signals  th l  and  ith s  for  N i ,..., 2 , 1 = . The disagreement among 
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Note that the first term on the right-hand side of (15) is forecast uncertainty,  th U  and the 
















.      ( 1 6 )  
                                                 
6 Our measure of uncertainty is different from the “combined uncertainty” as defined by the variance of 
aggregate density forecast in Wallis (2005), which includes both our measure of uncertainty and the 
disagreement as its components.   11
Barry and Jennings (1992) derived a similar relationship among uncertainty, 
disagreement and the average covariance in forecasts. Their result justifies forecast 
disagreement as one component of forecast uncertainty, which has, unfortunately, been 
unnoticed in the economics literature. Given our model, we can simplify the expression 

















,    (17) 
 
which can be easily interpreted as the uncertainty shared by all forecasters due to their 
exposure to common shocks. Thus, (17) greatly simplifies the results in Barry and 
Jennings (1992) and Barron et al. (1998), and gives the relationship (8).  
3. EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNCERTAINTY AND 
DISAGREEMENT 
This section begins with a short description of data on density forecasts used in 
this study. In subsequent sections, we present empirical evidence in support of our 
hypothesized relationship between disagreement and uncertainty over time and horizons. 
We then evaluate the appropriateness of using squared error of mean forecasts as a proxy 
for the variance of aggregate shocks that has been extensively used in recent accounting 
literature. Our suggestion to construct a robust measure of ex ante uncertainty given a 
panel of forecasts is presented at the end. 
3.1 Data 
The data in our study are taken from Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) 
that is provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. A unique feature of SPF 
data is that forecasters are also asked to provide density forecasts for output growth and 
inflation, which is the focus of this paper. The historical time series of forecasts in this   12
survey is quite lengthy (since the fourth quarter of 1968), and there are a number of 
changes in the surveys that make the data challenging to work with. We focus on the 
density forecasts for the change from year  1 − t  to t t h a t  w e r e  i s s u e d  i n  t h e  f o u r  
consecutive surveys from the first quarter through the fourth quarter of year t. The actual 
horizons for these four forecasts are approximately 3½, 2½, 1½, and ½ quarters but we 
shall refer to them simply as horizons 4, 3, 2, and 1 quarter. After deleting observations 
with missing values, we obtain a total of 4,986 observations for inflation over 1969:Q1 to 
2007:Q4 and 3,312 observations for output growth over 1981:Q3 to 2007:Q4.
7 For the 
purpose of estimation, we eliminate observations for infrequent respondents. We focus on 
the “regular” respondents who participated in at least 25 surveys in inflation forecasts and 
at least 17 surveys in output growth forecasts – approximately 15% in both cases. This 
leaves us with a total of 2,787 observations for inflation forecasts and 2,342 observations 
for output growth forecasts.
8 
To test the hypothesized relationships, we also need the actual values of inflation 
and output growth. As is well known, the NIPA data often go through serious revisions. 
Obviously, the most recent revision is not a good choice, since it involves adjustment of 
definitions and classifications. Consistent with the findings in Harvey and Newbold 
(2003) that the unrevised data approximates the forecasters’ objective better, we choose 
the first release of annual inflation and output growth to compute the actual values. These 
are the real-time data available from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
9 
                                                 
7 The Philadelphia Fed is uncertain about the target years referred to in the surveys made in the first quarter 
of 1985 and 1986. We deleted those forecasters who were obviously misled by the wrong wording of the 
question and used the rest of the responses.  
8 See Giordani and Söderlind (2003) and Lahiri and Liu (2005) for a detailed discussion on the 
specification and construction of the analytical sample, and hence not repeated here.  
9 All calculations reported in this paper were also repeated with the so called “first final” (i.e., the third 
monthly revision) and July revisions. The main results and conclusions were unchanged.    13
3.2 Test of the relationship between uncertainty and disagreement 
Note that the variance of forecast error in (6) can be interpreted as the variance of 
random variable  t A  as perceived by individual i, given information available at time 
h t − , which is conceptually the same as the variance of the density forecast reported by 
individual i. Taking the average of the variances of individual densities yields estimates 
of forecast uncertainty as defined in (7). 
To get appropriate measures of forecast disagreement, we need to control for any 
possible individual bias in the sample. Following Davies and Lahiri (1995), the individual 
forecast error has a 3-dimensional nested structure in the presence of individual bias  ih φ : 
ith th ih ith t ith F A e ε λ φ + + = − ≡ .        ( 1 8 )  
The systematic individual bias,  ih φ ˆ , can be estimated as  







ith t ih F A
T
φ         ( 1 9 )  
By adding these individual biases to the forecasts, we get unbiased forecasts and forecast 
disagreement.
10 
We should note that equation (8) specifies a relationship between uncertainty, 
disagreement and the variance of aggregate shocks based on unconditional expectations 
before observing any forecast or actual. However, the SPF forecast density data were 
obtained sequentially in the real time. Thus, we should develop a corresponding 
relationship in terms of expectations conditional on observing the individual forecasts 
(and hence disagreement  th d ) at time  h t − , but before the actual value  t A  was realized. 
                                                 
10 Since they were estimated to be relatively small, individual biases did not affect forecast disagreement by 
any significant amount.   14
Following Engle (1983), note that one can always decompose the average squared 














2 − + − = − ∑
=
.      ( 2 0 )  
Taking expectations on both sides given all available information at time t including  ith F  
and  th d , we get the following conditional relationship between aggregate uncertainty, the 
variance of consensus forecast errors and observed disagreement:  
. ) (
2
. th th t th d F A E U + − =          ( 2 1 )  
Now focusing on the first term on the right-hand side of (21), it can be alternatively 
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) ( .   (22) 
In the context of forecast combination, Batchelor and Dua (1995) had a similar 














) ( ε λ σ σ .         ( 2 3 )    
We should point out that the uncertainty about the consensus forecast in (23) defined by 
Bomberger (1996) is different from our measure of forecast uncertainty in (7). The 
uncertainty about the consensus forecast is less than the average of the individual 
uncertainties due to the fact that combining individual forecasts implicitly pools the 
diverse idiosyncratic errors. Note that, as the number of forecasters goes to infinity, the 
uncertainty about the consensus forecast will reflect only the uncertainty in the common 
information.  










ith th th d
N
U + + = ∑
=
ε λ σ σ         ( 2 4 )  
For typical values of N and 
2
ith ε σ  in our context, the second term on the right-hand side of 
(24) will be very close to zero and can be ignored.
11 Thus, the difference between the 
reported ex ante forecast uncertainty and disagreement will give approximately estimates 
of  ex ante variance of aggregate shocks in real time before the actual values were 
realized. Estimates of uncertainty, disagreement and their difference, which is an estimate 
of the variance of ex ante aggregate shock, are plotted in Figures 1 to 4. Their average 
values are given in Table 1. Several points are worth noting. Disagreement and 
uncertainty typically move together but the former is almost always smaller than the 
latter in both series, which is in line with the evidence that the former tends to 
underestimate the latter (cf. Zarnowitz and Lambros, 1987; Lahiri et al. 1988). Also, the 
difference between uncertainty and disagreement (i.e., the variance of ex ante aggregate 
shocks) in both series becomes larger, as forecast horizon gets longer from 1 quarter to 4 
quarters, which provides evidence in support of the horizon effect. Note also that the 
estimated variances of aggregate shocks are systematically much bigger for GDP growth 
than inflation at all horizons. This finding implies that it is more difficult to forecast real 
GDP growth than inflation, and is consistent with most recent studies on forecast 
evaluation that report significantly higher RMSE for real GDP than for inflation 
forecasts.
12 
                                                 








ε σ  lie between 0.01 and 0.02 for both inflation and output 
growth forecasts. 
12 See, for instance, Öller and Barot (2000), Banerjee and Marcellino (2006), and Reifschneider and Tulip 
(2007).    16
Second, somewhat unexpectedly, in some quarters disagreement exceeds 
uncertainty, especially for inflation. Certainly, one reason is the imprecision in the 
estimation of uncertainty and disagreement based on a finite sample of survey 
respondents. After all, relationships (8) and (24) are expected to hold only on the average. 
However, there are other possibilities that should be pointed out.  It could be that survey 
measure of uncertainty does not represent the “true” or objective uncertainty correctly. 
Diebold et al. (1999) concluded that survey uncertainty overestimates the true values. 
However, Giordani and Söderlind (2003) reached an opposite conclusion. Following the 
latter approach, in Table 2 we report the average percentage times the 90% predictive 
interval covers the actual outcomes after fitting a uniform distribution over the bins 
during 1969-2007. We find that survey measures of uncertainty are well calibrated for all 
horizons except 4-quarter ahead forecasts. For the 4-quarter ahead forecasts, the survey 
measure underestimates the objective uncertainty by 13% for inflation and 17% for 
output growth forecasts. This possible underestimation of the true uncertainty by survey 
densities can rule out a few of the negative estimates of the variance of aggregate 
shocks.
13 Also, if we believe that, for a particular horizon, the extent of under or over-
estimation is time invariant, the survey uncertainty will continue to be a meaningful 
indicator for true forecast uncertainty. Even if adjusted for the degree of underestimation 
by 13%, the uncertainty is still far less than disagreement at 4-quarter ahead inflation 
forecast for 1980. This can be a sign of the occurrence of structural break. Recall that for 
our decomposition of forecast errors into common and idiosyncratic components, the 
                                                 
13 Following Giordani and Söderlind (2003), we also fitted normal distributions over histograms and 
repeated the same comparison exercise. As expected, the normal approximation suggested even more 
underestimation. Many recent studies have, however, avoided the practice of fitting normal distribution to 
the individual density forecasts because the majority of the respondents seldom assign probabilities to more 
than 3 intervals, see Engelberg et al. (2006).     17
individual forecast errors were assumed to be a stationary process. As is well known, 
inflation rose sharply and unexpectedly during 1979-1981, and is characterized by a 
structural break in the inflation process. Thus, the stationary assumption is violated and 
accordingly (24) may not hold during periods of structural breaks. If the economic system 
is temporarily non-stationary due to structural breaks and regime change, there will 
typically be many different beliefs about the future course of the economy. This leads to 
forecasters adopting disparate forecasting functions and as a result, their predictions will 
generate extraordinary disagreement. Uncertainty, on the other hand, is seen to be very 
sticky in terms of its high autocorrelation and low volatility and as a result, responds 
slowly to even rapid changes in the economic environment.
14 Thus, whereas the relatively 
large negative variance of aggregate shocks may suggest periods of structural breaks and 
regime change, the smaller ones can be attributed to imprecision in small sample 
estimation.   
Third, Figures 1-4 suggest that the volatility of aggregate shocks declined sharply 
after 1991 for both inflation and output growth. This finding contributes to our 
understanding of the factors behind Great Moderation - the well-documented decline in 
macroeconomic volatility in the United States since 1984. Our result suggests that the 
decline in macroeconomic volatility during 1984-1991 can not be attributed to “good 
luck”, since the economy was hit by unforeseen large shocks during this period (cf. 
Campbell, 2007), and instead must be explained by other factors, such as structural 
changes (cf. McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000) or improved monetary policy (cf. 
                                                 
14 This is also true for time series measures of uncertainty. Giordani and Söderlind (2003) and Lahiri and 
Liu (2005) show that the GARCH measure of uncertainty fails to capture the increase in inflation 
uncertainty around the second oil price shock.   18
Mishkin, 2007). After 1991, the shocks hitting the economy became smaller and more 
stable, and thus played a large role in the reduction of macroeconomic volatility. 
Now we can test formally the implications of (24) that the relationship between 
uncertainty and disagreement depends on the variance of aggregate shocks over time and 
across horizons. By plotting actual inflation rate, we find its average value during 1969-
1983 to be at least 2.5 times than that during 1984-2007, consistent with the stylized fact 
documented in the literature, cf. Stock and Watson (2007). As is well known, higher rates  
of inflation are generally associated with higher variability of inflation and presumably 
greater uncertainty about future rates. We thus divide the sample of inflation forecasts 
into two periods: the unstable period (1969-1983) and the stable period (1984-2007). To 
study the relationship between uncertainty and disagreement, we run the following 
regression: 
, 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 th th th H H H H D U ε ρ ρ ρ ρ β + + + + + =     (25) 
where 1 = i H  if the forecast is made at horizon i for  , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 = i  and 0 otherwise. 
Table 3 shows the estimation results. The estimated coefficient on disagreement is 
0.43 for inflation forecasts during 1969-83. The same coefficient during 1984-2007 is 
estimated to be 0.76 and 0.72 for inflation and GDP forecasts, respectively. Thus the 
evidence from SPF density forecasts supports our model implication that disagreement is 
a good proxy for uncertainty when the variance of aggregate shocks is small, and is 
consistent with the empirical results presented by Bomberger (1996) and Giordani and 
Söderlind (2003). As is also clear in Table 3, the difference between uncertainty and 
disagreement, which is an estimate of ex ante variance of aggregate shocks, is larger, as 
forecast horizon gets longer. For example, as the horizon increases from 1 quarter to 4   19
quarters, the difference increases monotonically from 0.24 to 0.96 in output growth 
forecast. This pattern is also observed for inflation forecasts during the stable period at all 
horizons with the exception of 4-quarter ahead forecasts, which means that the additional 
variability due to the shocks that fell during the first quarter of the current year (on the 
average during 1984-2007) compared to the remaining quarters is not significant. This is 
caused by the relatively high disagreement in 4-quarter ahead forecasts during the 1986-
1989 period compared to other forecasts (see Figure 1). Furthermore, all horizon 
dummies are estimated to be statistically significant at the 5% level. On balance, the 
empirical evidence above shows that the variance of aggregate shocks accumulates 
systematically over horizons, as predicted by our model. This finding is important since 
most of studies have focused on their relationship over time, without specifying the 
underlying forecast horizons.
15  
3.3 Should squared error of mean forecast be used as a proxy for
2
λ σ ? 
An influential paper in the accounting literature by Barron et al. (1998) extended 
the model in Barry and Jennings (1992) and suggested “one can infer uncertainty and 
consensus from observable forecast dispersion, error in the mean forecast and the number 
of forecasts” (Barron et al. 1998, p. 427). Their suggestion has been extensively used to 
study the information environment in analysts’ earning forecasts. Yet, without direct 
information on uncertainty, the validity of their suggestion in finite samples can never be 
established. Our analysis below addresses this question. 
                                                 
15 Two exceptions are the recent papers by Lahiri and Sheng (2007) and Patton and Timmermann (2007), 
who explicitly modeled the evolution of survey forecasts over horizons.   20
Barron et al. (1998) argued that one can use the squared error in the mean forecast 
as a proxy for 
2
th λ σ  to empirically estimate forecast uncertainty as in the following 
equation: 
th th t th d
N
F A U )
1
1 ( ) ( ˆ 2
. − + − = .        ( 2 6 )  
Because forecast errors are known to respondents only after the announcement of actual 
values, (26) indeed yields a measure of ex post uncertainty. Its reliability as a proxy for ex 
ante uncertainty faced by individual forecasters at the time of forecast is questionable. 
With density forecasts at our disposal, we can compare them directly. Figures 5 and 6 
plot these two measures of uncertainty in inflation and output growth forecasts during 
1984-2007. The general message is that, compared to survey measure of uncertainty, ex 
post uncertainty from (26) is considerably more volatile. The ex post uncertainty 
overstates the survey measure of uncertainty whenever a forecast is followed by a large 
unanticipated forecast error. This is unfortunate because, being unanticipated, these errors 
should not have affected the forecast uncertainty that predates the observed forecast error. 
The regression results in Table 4 reinforce some of the features from these graphs. For 
inflation forecasts, the estimated coefficient of ex post uncertainty is almost zero during 
the unstable period 1969-83. Even in the stable period, the coefficients are estimated to 
be very small for both inflation and output growth forecasts. Comparing 
2 R
 in Tables 3 
and 4, we see that disagreement alone is a reasonable proxy for uncertainty. However, 
adding the squared error in the consensus forecast to disagreement turns out to be a 
significantly worse proxy for uncertainty than the disagreement alone. 
2 R
 falls from 0.34 
to 0.09 during 1969-83 and from 0.39 to 0.30 during 1984-2007 for inflation, implying   21
that the squared forecast errors contribute negatively to explaining survey uncertainty. 
For real GDP, the squared forecast errors have practically no additional explanatory 
power, as 
2 R
 increases from 0.53 to 0.54.  
To understand this puzzle, note the decomposition in (20). Comparing (20) with 
(26), it immediately follows that ex post uncertainty is nothing but the average squared 
individual forecast errors.
16 Clearly, forecast uncertainty constructed according to Barron 
et al. (1998) depends on the realization of individual forecast errors. But forecast error is 
necessarily an ex post quantity, which reflects unexpected shocks after the forecast is 
made, and thus should not affect uncertainty at the time a forecast is issued. One may 
think that it may be an acceptable practice to use mean squared forecast error as a proxy 
for its ex ante counterpart because Barron et al. (1998) are looking at forecast uncertainty 
retrospectively. Their measure has been used to study the impact of special events, such 
as Regulation Fair Disclosure, on the forecasting environment of financial analysts, see, 
for example, Mohanram and Sunder (2006) and references therein. Even in this historical 
context, squared forecast error can give very misleading indication of the uncertainty 
environment in real time in a past sample, as shown by the extra variability in ex post 
uncertainty during periods that are characterized by large ex post forecast errors (see 
Figures 5 and 6).  
Engle (1983) demonstrated that the average squared individual forecast errors do 
not show patterns similar to ARCH measures of uncertainty.
17 Our findings here, together 
                                                 
16 During our sample period, the squared error of the mean forecast accounts for 40% to 70% of ex post 
uncertainty in output growth forecast and from 30% to 60% in inflation forecast, as the horizon gets longer 
from 1- to 4-quarter ahead. The remainder is attributable to disagreement.  
17 As shown in Table 2 of Engle (1983), the average squared individual forecast errors are 31.78 (1947/12-
1952/6), 1.35 (1962/6-1966/12) and 13.01 (1971/6-1975/12), but the corresponding ARCH uncertainty is 
19.22, 2.57 and 3.37, respectively.    22
with the empirical evidence presented in Engle (1983), strongly caution against using the 
squared error in the mean forecast as a component of overall forecast uncertainty. We 
show that forecast disagreement by itself, without the ex post mean squared error, 
correlates better with the observed survey uncertainty. 
Interestingly, Reifschneider and Tulip (2007) have recently suggested a similar 
measure of past forecast uncertainty using squared individual forecast errors of a number 
of private and government forecasters averaged over 1986-2006. The purpose is to use 
this average historical uncertainty based on past predictive accuracy as a benchmark 
against which FOMC participants can assess their present uncertainty.  In order to 
generate this benchmark for a “typical” uncertainty to be associated with the individual 
forecasts, they first calculate the individual root mean squared error (RMSE) over the 
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Note that the above measure is different from the one suggested by our analysis. Instead, 
according to (20), one should use  














      ( 2 8 )  
to estimate the typical uncertainty of a randomly drawn forecaster from the sample. It is 
clear that the Reifschneider-Tulip measure (27), like (28), will have the disagreement and 
the squared consensus forecast error as components of uncertainty. Also, because of the 
averaging of squared consensus forecast errors over the last twenty years, (27) may not 
be very sensitive to occasional large forecast errors, and thus, may be a reasonable 
approximation for the average variance of ex ante aggregate shocks over the period.   23
However, according to Jensen’s inequality, we can easily show that in general 
2 1 RMSE RMSE ≤ , the latter having been justified in our previous analysis as the 
appropriate measure of benchmark ex post uncertainty. In order to gauge the extent of 
underestimation in our sample, we calculated the two measures using our data during 
1986-2006. As can be seen in Table 5, the Reifschneider-Tulip measure underestimates 
the benchmark uncertainty (28), by 4% to 8% for inflation forecasts. The degree of 
underestimation is even more pronounced for GDP forecasts ranging from 8% to 13%. 
Also, we find that this benchmark measure of historical uncertainty based on average ex 
post predictive accuracy can be sensitive to occasional large forecast errors. For instance, 
the one-quarter ahead GDP forecast for 1995 is associated with an unusually large error 
due to the sudden slowdown of the U.S. economy. If we take out this large forecast error 
from our calculations for GDP forecasts, the measures based on (27) and (28) decrease 
from 0.47 to 0.40 and from 0.54 to 0.47, respectively (cf. Table 5).  
3.4 Construction of an ex ante measure of uncertainty 
Because uncertainty is essentially an ex ante concept attached to a forecast before 
the actual outcome is known, it must be constructed using data available in real time. To 
form a measure of forecast uncertainty, we should use the observed disagreement from 
the survey,  th d  and the variance of aggregate shocks generated conditionally by GARCH-
type models, 
2 ˆ th λ σ  (cf. Engle, 1982; Bollerslev, 1986) to estimate  th U : 
. ˆ ˆ 2
th th th d U + = λ σ         ( 2 9 )  
The justification is as follows. Uncertainty comes from two sources: the error 
components in common information and in private information. 
2 ˆ th λ σ  captures the   24
imprecision in common information, and  th d  reflects the same in forecasters’ 
idiosyncratic information and diversity in forecasting models. The measure of uncertainty 
in (29) avoids the drawback of the inability to capture the heterogeneity of forecasting 
models in using GARCH measure of uncertainty alone. Our suggestion is supported by 
the findings in Batchelor and Dua (1993) and Bomberger (1996); in a comparison of 
ARCH and survey measures of uncertainty, these two studies concluded that the former 
tends to be lower than the latter, and more importantly the former is less variable over 
time than the latter. Thus, if one accepts survey measures as valid, ARCH measure alone 
underestimates the level and the variation in uncertainty over time.  
In order to generate GARCH-type estimates of the variability of aggregate shocks, 
we first filter the mean forecast errors for possible autocorrelation, see Harvey and 
Newbold (2003). The order of autocorrelation present in a given mean forecast error 
series is found by fitting moving average models of varying order, the preferred model 
being chosen by the use of Schwarz information criterion. We then estimated 
2
t λ σ  using 
different GARCH-type models with various distributional assumptions on the filtered 
mean forecast errors. For convenience, these models are labeled as Model 1 through 
Model 8. In Model 1, we estimated the standard GARCH (1, 1) model with the following 
specification: 
) , 0 ( ~
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where  t e  is the serially uncorrelated mean forecast error. Equation (30) has been 
estimated using the quasi-maximum likelihood (cf. Bollerslev and Wooldridge, 1992) for 
the 1984-2007 subsample and for each horizon. Consistent with many earlier studies, in 
Model 2 we estimated (30) using the t-distribution with 6 degrees of freedom. As an   25
alternative specification, we replaced the lagged mean squared forecast error in (30) with 
the average of mean squared errors over the last ten years.
18 In Model 3, we estimated 
2
t λ σ  using the following model specification: 
) , 0 ( ~
2
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s t t MSE λ λ σ β β β σ .     (31) 
Model 4 estimated (31) using the t-distribution with 6 degrees of freedom. Models 5 
through 8 correspond to Models 1 through 4, except that we modeled the standard 
deviation instead of the variance in the GARCH-type models. The estimation results, not 
reported here, show that the lagged variance of aggregate shocks was significant at the 
5% level in the majority of the cases, but the lagged mean forecast errors, as well as the 
average of mean squared errors over the last ten years, are only significant in some cases, 
depending on the horizons and variables under study.
19 
According to (29), forecast uncertainty is generated by the sum of the estimated 
variance of aggregate shocks 
2 ˆ th λ σ  from GARCH-type models and the disagreement from 
the survey. Table 6 shows the correlations between survey and other measures of 
uncertainty. Several points stand out. First, the GARCH estimates of uncertainty with the 
average squared errors over the last ten years (in place of the last period forecast error) 
help to capture the variation in the survey measure of uncertainty (Models 3, 4, 7 and 8) 
fairly well. Compared to the simple correlation with the disagreement alone (the first row 
in Table 6), the correlations between the survey uncertainty and the uncertainty generated 
by Models 3, 4, 7 and 8 increase by about 5% for 1- and 2-quarter ahead inflation 
                                                 
18 During 1974-1981, SPF did not ask for the annual average forecast. We matched the reported quarterly 
point forecasts with the real time data to derive the implied annual forecasts for the current year. 
19 Following Bomberger (1996), we also added disagreement in the variance equation of the GARCH 
models and found that disagreement never became significant at the 5% level. This is consistent with the 
findings in Rich and Butler (1998).   26
forecasts, and by more than 15% and 10% for 3- and 4-quarter ahead GDP forecasts, 
respectively. Second, models with t-distributions (Models 2, 4, 6 and 8) match survey 
measure of uncertainty better. In general, Models 2, 4, 6 and 8 using t-distribution with 6 
degree of freedom perform better to capture the variation in survey uncertainty than 
Models 1, 3, 5 and 7 using normal distribution. Third, modeling the standard deviation 
instead of the variance tends to do a better job in representing the variation in survey 
measure of uncertainty. For output growth forecasts, the best model seems to be Model 8 
that performs even better at longer horizons. For inflation forecasts, the best model is 
Model 8 at shorter horizons and Model 6 at longer horizons. In addition, when we add 
squared errors to disagreement (Model 0), its predictive power to proxy survey 
uncertainty decreases across almost all horizons for both variables – a point that we have 
established before in section 3.3.  
  In summary, the GARCH-type models are very successful in modeling the 
variability of future aggregate shocks to the economy in the sense that when added to 
disagreement, this composite measure of ex ante forecast uncertainty explains the 
corresponding survey measure better than disagreement alone.
20 
We plot the evolution of uncertainty generated from the best models in inflation 
and output growth forecasts over time in Figures 5 and 6. Compared to the uncertainty 
constructed using the squared error in the mean forecast, the uncertainty from GARCH-
type models is less volatile and thus matches better the survey measure of uncertainty. 
This underscores the important point that ex ante uncertainty has to be generated 
conditionally based on the information known to survey respondents when making their 
                                                 
20 We also estimated Models 1, 2, 5 and 6 during 1969-2007. We find that the generated uncertainty 
according to these four models cannot beat the disagreement alone to match the survey measure of 
uncertainty when we include the unstable period.   27
forecasts, which is exactly what GARCH-type models do. We should, however, note that 
the error-based measures of uncertainty including the GARCH have failed to signal the 
slowly creeping uncertainty in inflation and output growth forecasts since 2002 as 
indicated by the density forecasts. This is because the corresponding forecast errors have 
continued to be small despite the slow but steady increase in uncertainty due to unusual 
financial market developments and political instability in recent years. Uncertainty 
estimates based on density forecasts have an obvious advantage in this regard.  
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Due to the ready availability of point forecasts, disagreement among forecasters 
has been widely used as a proxy for aggregate uncertainty in the economics, accounting 
and finance literature. Lacking theoretical basis, empirical evidence has been mixed as to 
whether the disagreement is a reliable measure for the uncertainty. Using a standard 
decomposition of forecast errors into common and idiosyncratic shocks in a panel data 
setting, our paper demonstrates that under certain regularity conditions, the difference 
between uncertainty and disagreement is the perceived variance of future aggregate 
shocks that accumulate over horizons. This result has important implications. It implies 
that the robustness of the relationship between uncertainty and disagreement depends on 
the variance of aggregate shocks over time and across horizons. Using the SPF density 
forecasts for inflation and output growth, we find direct evidence in support of our 
hypothesized time and horizon effects. As for the time effect, disagreement is found to be 
a reliable measure for uncertainty in a stable period. In periods with large volatility of 
aggregate shocks, however, disagreement becomes less useful a proxy. As for the horizon 
effect, we find that the longer the forecast horizon, the larger is the difference between   28
disagreement and uncertainty. Though disagreement alone tends to understate the level of 
uncertainty, our empirical results suggest that one can safely use disagreement as a proxy 
for uncertainty in a regression context, provided the forecast environment is relatively 
stable. By subtracting observed disagreement from uncertainty using density forecasts, 
we obtain a truly ex ante measure of aggregate shocks that befell on the economy. These 
aggregate shocks are available to a policy maker before the actual values are realized, and 
show remarkable reduction in the volatility after 1991.    
Our results do not support the use of squared mean forecast errors to construct ex 
ante uncertainty, as often practiced in recent accounting and finance research. Since 
forecast error is an ex post measure reflecting unexpected shocks after the forecast is 
made, it should not affect uncertainty at the time of forecast. In order to construct an ex 
ante measure of forecast uncertainty, one should use the sum of the observed 
disagreement from the survey and the projected variance of aggregate shocks generated 
by a suitably specified GARCH model. We find that this approach performs much better 
than the use of squared forecast errors in matching the survey measure of uncertainty, and 







   29
Reference: 
Abarbanell JS, Lanen WN, Verrecchia RE. 1995. Analysts’ forecasts as proxies for 
investor beliefs in empirical research. Journal of Accounting and Economics 20: 31-
60. 
Banerjee A, Marcellino M. 2006. Are there any reliable leading indicators for US 
inflation and GDP growth? International Journal of Forecasting 22: 137-151. 
Barron OE, Kim O, Lim SC, Stevens DE. 1998. Using analysts’ forecasts to measure 
properties of analysts’ information environment. The Accounting Review 73: 421-433. 
Barry CB, Jennings RH. 1992. Information and diversity of analyst opinion. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 27: 169-183. 
Batchelor R, Dua P. 1993. Survey vs. ARCH measures of inflation uncertainty. Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 55: 341-353. 
Batchelor R, Dua P. 1995. Forecast diversity and the benefits of combining forecasts. 
Management Science 41: 68-75.  
Boero G, Smith J, Wallis KF. 2007. Uncertainty and disagreement in economic 
prediction: the Bank of England Survey of External Forecasters. Forthcoming in 
Economic Journal. 
Bollerslev T. 1986. Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity. Journal of 
Econometrics 31: 307-327.  
Bollerslev T, Wooldridge JM. 1992. Quasi-maximum likelihood estimation and inference 
in dynamic models with time varying covariances. Econometric Reviews 11: 143-172. 
Bomberger WA. 1996. Disagreement as a measure of uncertainty. Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking 28: 381-392.   30
Bomberger WA. 1999. Disagreement and uncertainty: a reply to Rich and Butler. Journal 
of Money, Credit and Banking 31: 273-276. 
Campbell SD. 2007. Macroeconomic volatility, predictability, and uncertainty in the 
great moderation: evidence from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics 25: 191-200. 
Davies A, Lahiri K. 1995. A new framework for analyzing survey forecasts using three-
dimensional panel data. Journal of Econometrics 68: 205-227. 
Diebold, FX, Tay, AS, Wallis, KF. 1999. Evaluating density forecasts of inflation: The 
survey of professional forecasters. In: Engle, R.F., White, H. (Eds.), Cointegration, 
Causality, and Forecasting: A Festschrift in Honour of Clive W.J. Granger. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Diether KB, Malloy CJ, Scherbian A. 2002. Differences of opinion and the cross section 
of stock returns. The Journal of Finance 57: 2113-2141. 
Engle RF. 1982. Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity with estimates of the 
variance of United Kingdom inflation. Econometrica 50: 987-1008. 
Engle RF. 1983. Estimates of the variance of U.S. inflation based upon the ARCH model. 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 15: 286-301. 
Engelberg J, Manski CF, and Williams J. 2006. Comparing the point predictions and 
subjective probability distributions of professional forecasters, Forthcoming in 
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics.   
Giordani P, Söderlind P. 2003. Inflation forecast uncertainty. European Economic Review 
47: 1037-1059.   31
Harvey D, Newbold P. 2003. The non-normality of some macroeconomic forecast errors. 
International Journal of Forecasting 19: 635-653. 
Johnson TC. 2004. Forecast dispersion and the cross section of expected returns. The 
Journal of Finance 59: 1957-1978. 
Lahiri K, Teigland C, Zaporowski M. 1988. Interest rates and the subjective probability 
distribution of inflation forecasts. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 20: 233-248. 
Lahiri K, Liu F. 2005. ARCH models for multi-period forecast uncertainty - a reality 
check using a panel of density forecasts. In Advances in Econometrics, volume 20: 
Econometric Analysis of Financial Time Series, edited by T. Fomby and D. Terrell, 
pp. 321-363. Elsevier, JAI Press. 
Lahiri K, Liu F. 2006. Modeling multi-period inflation uncertainty using a panel of 
density forecasts. Journal of Applied Econometrics 21: 1199-1220. 
Lahiri K, Sheng X. 2007. Evolution of forecast disagreement in a Bayesian learning 
model. Forthcoming in Journal of Econometrics. 
McConnell MM, Perez-Quiros G. 2003. Output fluctuations in the United States: what 
has changed since the early 1980’s? American Economic Review 90: 1464-1476. 
Mishkin FS. 2007. Inflation dynamics. Speech delivered at the Annual Macro 
Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, California (March 23).  
Mohanram PS, Sunder SV. 2006. How has regulation FD affected the operations of 
financial analysts? Contemporary Accounting Research 23: 491-525. 
Öller LE, Barot B. 2000. The accuracy of European growth and inflation forecasts. 
International Journal of Forecasting 16: 293-315.   32
Reifschneider D, Tulip P. 2007. Gauging the uncertainty of the economic outlook from 
historical forecasting errors. Federal Reserve Board, Finance and Economics 
Discussion Series: 60. 
Rich RW, Butler JS. 1998. Disagreement as a measure of uncertainty: a comment on 
Bomberger. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 30: 411-419. 
Stock JH, Watson MW. 2007. Why has U.S. inflation become harder to forecast? Journal 
of Money, Credit and Banking 39: 3-33. 
Timmermann A, Patton A. 2007. Learning in real time: theory and empirical evidence 
from the term structure of survey forecasts. working paper, UCSD. 
Wallis KF. 2005. Combining density and interval forecasts: a modest proposal. Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 67: 983-994. 
Zarnowitz V, Lambros LA. 1987. Consensus and uncertainty in economic prediction. 
Journal of Political Economy 95: 591-621. 












   33
Table 1. Uncertainty and disagreement averaged over time 
                            
  SPF inflation forecast (1969-2007)  SPF GDP forecast (1981-2007) 
  1Q ahead 2Q ahead 3Q ahead 4Q ahead  1Q ahead 2Q ahead 3Q ahead 4Q ahead
Uncertainty 0.33 0.48 0.58 0.69  0.41 0.74 1.02 1.25 
Disagreement  0.18 0.26 0.32 0.42  0.22 0.25 0.26 0.37 
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Table 2. Comparison of 90% predictive interval with actual outcomes 
 
              
Horizon  4Q ahead  3Q ahead  2Q ahead  1Q ahead 
SPF  Inflation  78.48 85.46 89.34 88.22 
SPF Output growth  74.35  87.17  85.95  83.33 
Note: This table shows the percentage of times that the 90% predictive interval covers the actual 
outcomes. Predictive intervals are constructed from SPF individual density forecasts during 1969-
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Table 3. Regression of survey measure of uncertainty on disagreement over time 
              
  SPF inflation forecast     SPF GDP forecast 
 1969-1983  1984-2007    1984-2007 
Disagreement 0.43* 0.76*    0.72* 
 (0.08)  (0.19)    (0.25) 
H1 0.39*  0.17*    0.24* 
 (0.13)  (0.03)    (0.04) 
H2 0.34*  0.31*    0.56* 
 (0.04)  (0.04)    (0.05) 
H3 0.36*  0.42*    0.81* 
 (0.06)  (0.04)    (0.06) 
H4 0.53*  0.39*    0.96* 
 (0.06)  (0.07)      (0.09) 
 Adj. R
2 0.34  0.39    0.53 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. One asterisk denotes that the estimated values are 
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Table 4. Regression of survey measure of uncertainty on ex post uncertainty 
              
  SPF inflation forecast     SPF GDP forecast 
 1969-1983  1984-2007    1984-2007 
Ex post uncertainty  0.02  0.27*    0.25* 
 (0.02)  (0.07)    (0.05) 
H1 0.46*  0.24*    0.30* 
 (0.22)  (0.02)    (0.01) 
H2 0.49*  0.40*    0.62* 
 (0.05)  (0.02)    (0.02) 
H3 0.55*  0.49*    0.84* 
 (0.06)  (0.03)    (0.03) 
H4 0.75*  0.48*    0.93* 
 (0.06)  (0.05)      (0.06) 
 Adj. R
2 0.09  0.30    0.54 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. One asterisk denotes that the estimated values are 
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Table 5. Measures of uncertainty based on forecast errors averaged over 1986-2006 
                             
  SPF inflation forecast    SPF GDP forecast 
  1Q ahead2Q ahead 3Q ahead4Q ahead   1Q ahead2Q ahead 3Q ahead4Q ahead
             
RMSE1  0.49 0.52 0.56 0.64    0.47 0.52 0.62 0.97 
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Table 6. Correlation between survey uncertainty and alternative measures of uncertainty 
                            
  SPF inflation forecast (1984-2007)  SPF GDP forecast (1984-2007) 
  1Q ahead 2Q ahead3Q ahead4Q ahead  1Q ahead2Q ahead 3Q ahead4Q ahead
Disagreement  0.56 0.52 0.55 0.60  0.60 0.30 0.44 0.58 
Model  0  0.36 0.49 0.56 0.52  0.32 0.24 0.39 0.57 
Model  1  0.56 0.51 0.67 0.44    0.63 0.33 0.46 0.42 
Model  2  0.59 0.51 0.67 0.53    0.62 0.32 0.42 0.47 
Model  3  0.62 0.54 0.64 0.51    0.56 0.24 0.60 0.70 
Model  4  0.61 0.54 0.61 0.53    0.61 0.31 0.62 0.71 
Model  5  0.57 0.52 0.66 0.49    0.58 0.20 0.37 0.50 
Model  6  0.57 0.53 0.67 0.54    0.63 0.34 0.39 0.33 
Model  7  0.62 0.56 0.61 0.52    0.58 0.37 0.62 0.69 
Model  8  0.63 0.56 0.61 0.51    0.61 0.34 0.61 0.71 
Note: This table presents the correlations between survey and alternative measures of uncertainty. 
Alternative measures of uncertainty are generated by the sum of the variance of aggregate shocks 
from Models 0 to 8 and the disagreement from the survey. In particular, in Model 0, the squared 
error in the mean forecasts is used as a proxy for the variance of aggregate shocks. In Models 1 
through 8, the variance of aggregate shocks is generated from the following models: 
 
Model 1: GARCH (1, 1) with normal distribution; 
Model 2: GARCH (1, 1) with t-distribution (6 degree of freedom); 
Model 3: GARCH (0, 1) with the average of mean squared errors (MSE) over the last 10 years 
and normal distribution; 
Model 4: GARCH (0, 1) with the average of mean squared errors (MSE) over the last 10 years 
and t-distribution (6 degree of freedom); 
Model 5: Power GARCH (1, 1) with normal distribution; 
Model 6: Power GARCH (1, 1) with t-distribution (6 degree of freedom); 
Model 7: Power GARCH (0, 1) with the average of root mean squared errors (RMSE) over the 
last 10 years and normal distribution; 
Model 8: Power GARCH (0, 1) with the average of root mean squared errors (RMSE) over the 
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Figure 5. Measures of uncertainty in inflation forecasts: 
Survey measure of uncertainty (solid line) 
Uncertainty using squared error of mean forecast (dotted line) 
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Figure 6. Measures of uncertainty in output growth forecasts: 
Survey measure of uncertainty (solid line) 
Uncertainty using squared error of mean forecast (dotted line) 
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